Introduction 1
Thenew fieldofthe historyofknowledge is oftenpresentedasamere expansion of thehistory of science. It hasb eenportrayed as nothingmorethanmakinge xplicit theb roadeningo ft he scopeo ft he historyo fs cience,w hich thed iscipline hasu ndergone anyway sincet he turn to practicei nt he 1970s. On that reading, thescope of thehistory of knowledgeisessentiallythe same as that of thenew his-S. DuprØ,U trecht University Facultyo fH umanities, Utrecht, Netherlands, E-Mail: S.G.M.Dupre@uu.nl G. Somsen,M aastrichtU niversityF aculty of Arts andS ocialS ciences, Maastricht,N etherlands, E-Mail:g.somsen@maastrichtuniversity.nl 2019 TheAuthors.Published by Wiley-VCHV erlagGmbH&Co.KGaA. This is an open access articleu nder thet erms of theC reativeC ommons AttributionL icense, whichp ermits use, distribution andr eproduction in anym edium, provided theo riginalw orki s properly cited. tory of science, whichnow alsoincludes, withoutmuchcontention, forexample, non-Westernand artisanalknowledge practices. It is noteworthy that even proponentso ft he historyo fk nowledge pointo ut that theh istory of scienceh as been leadingthe way.Interms of thefutureprospects of thedisciplineofthe historyof knowledge, PeterB urke envisionsaglobal approach (concentratingo n" knowledge on them ove,"" encounters,c lashes,t ranslationsa nd hybridizations"), as ociala pproach( whichw ould entail "a historyo fk nowledgef romb elow"a nd "everydayk nowledges,i ncludingt he tacit, bodily knowledges …n ot only in crafts such as metal-workingbut also in fields as diverseasdiplomacy,trade,connoisseurship,managementand sport"), andaconcernwiththe longterm(focusingo nt he useo fl anguagea nd thei nvention of writings ystems,f or example). 2 Yet, whileanthropologists, archaeologists,and global historians have much to say on thesea pproaches, it is fair to sayt hatt heyn everthelesse merged from within thehistory of science( "ashas so oftenhappened,"a ccording to Burke) .Lorraine Daston observedthatthe historyofknowledge is currentlyusedfor twodifferent research agendas: onethatfocuses on "forms of knowledget hath avehistorically been denigrated as substandard" (sucha st he skills of artisans), theo ther on the historyo fl earning andt he humanities,w hich is primarilyp racticed by highly educated elites andh as little in commonw itht he activities of craftsmen. 3 The only thingt hese twor esearchp rogramss eemt os hare is that they aren ot about science, andthus, thehistory of knowledgeisdefined only in anegativeway.
We do notd isagreew itht he broadening of thes cope of historyo fs cience;i n fact,w ew elcome thee xpansion of thef ield of theh istory of sciencet ot he humanities,t os cience in non-Westernc ontextsa nd to vernacular knowledge, and acknowledget hatt he historyo fk nowledge is made possible ands houldb uild upon this recent work in thef ield of theh istory of science. 4 However, we argue that thecarving outofthe newfield of thehistory of knowledgeservesmoreambitiousaimsthanmereexpansion.Moreprecisely,weclaim that theseaims should be more ambitiousindirectresponsetothe challenges posedtousbypresent-day knowledges ocieties in whiche xpertise,w hether scientific or not, is widely contested,a nd in whicht he valueo fd ifferent formso fk nowledge is fluid. Ther edefinition of thehistoriographical domain of thehistory of knowledgeallowsand urges us to asknew questionsconcerningthe boundaries,hierarchies,and mutual constitution of differenttypes of knowledgeasw ellastothe role andassessment of failurea nd ignorancei nm akingk nowledge.T hese issues have pertinence in thec urrent climatew here expertisei sr elentlesslyq uestioneda nd authority often seemstoloseits ground.Asarecent exchange between Martin Mulsow andLor-raineD astons hows,t he historyo fk nowledge, primarilyd efined as being about epistemich ierarchies andtheir dynamics,can offerinsights into thesecurrent societal challenges. 5 In this paper, we will indicate some fruitful newavenues forresearchinthe history of knowledgeillustrated by examples from thes ixteenth to twentiethc entu-2 Burke2015, on 102-103. 3 Daston 2017,on143. 4 Forthe consequences of this expansionfor thehistory of earlymodernscience,see Smith2009. 5 Mulsow andDaston2019. Ber. Wissenschaftsgesch. 42 (2019):186 -199 187 ries.T akent ogether, we hope that they will show that theh istory of knowledge couldbuild theexpertise required by thechallengesofthe twenty-first century. In itself,s uchr esponsivenessi snotn ew.I nf act, thed isciplineo ft he historyo fs cience hasalwaysdeveloped in response to thedemands posedbyscience andsociety, evers ince itse mergence in thee arly twentiethc entury.W ei llustrate this in then exts ection,showing howo vert hisp eriod, thef ield evolved from ac ontext of belle Øpoque positivism viapost-warscientism to Cold Warmodernism and, finally,1 970s relativism-alwaysi nr eactiont oc hangings ocietalc ircumstances andenvironments.
HistoryofScience in Context
Historyo fs cience wasn ever established (ors ustained)f or its" intrinsicv alue." From itsstart as an academic field, it received supportbecause it seemed valuable fors pecificp urposesa nd because it seemed to offera na nswer to issues of the time.I fanyonew as awareo ft his, it was thef ield's most tireless organizeri nthe earlyt wentieth century,G eorgeS arton. Sarton believed that history of science should exist as an autonomous discipline,worthyinand of itself,yet he knew he hadtoshowwhatthisexistence was for if he was evergoing to make this possible. Throughout hisc areerh ep ubliclyp ronouncedt he field'sa ims, calling attention to various raisons-d'Þtre:History of sciencecould help "humanize"the sciences by showingt heir trackrecorda sahumana chievement. It coulds howt he "unity of mankind" by science'sd emonstrableu niversality. Andi tc ould reveal the" secret history" of steady civilizational progresst hatr egular historians failed to seei n theirfocus on warand conquest,bloodshed andpower grab. 6 Allthese reasonspointedtoageneralculturalvalue thatappealedtothe liberal positivist milieu of Sarton's belle Øpoque Belgium. 7 Butwhenhemoved to theUS in 1915, he enteredawholly differentcontext wherehis argumentsnolongerhad thesametraction. In fact,despite hissuccess running Isis andsettingupthe History of ScienceS ociety,S artonr eceived remarkably little material support forhis enterprise.Heowedhis position at Harvardtothe CarnegieInstitution of Washington whosedirectorl iked hisb road view of science( that he missed amongthe scientists that he normally funded). 8 Butthe university itself wasquite uncommitted, paid no salary,and provided no chair-only awindowlessspace in theWidener Libraryand asmall annual feefor teaching an undergraduatecourse. 9 Sarton made waves, buthis vision of thefield remained unrealised for most of hiscareer.
Thef irst steps toward academic institutionalization only came ag eneration later, andagain notfor thefield's intrinsicvalue,but forits educationalfunction. JamesB ryant Conant,f ormero verseer of theM anhattan Projecta nd long-time 6 Sarton gave theset hree reasonsi nh is manifesto" TheN ew Humanism"( 1924):9-42, on 16, 24 ff., 33,based on theF renchoriginalof1918. Elsewherehemadestill differentappeals,the earliestp romising to discover the" laws of [scientific] development" by recordingt he pace of discovery over time:"L' Histoire de la Science", RevueGØnØrale de la Science 23 (1912):93-94,on94. 7 Wils,2005. 8 SeeS arton'sc orrespondencew itht hisd irector, Robert SimpsonW oodward, between1 916a nd 1919.Harvard University,HoughtonLibrary,MsAm1803, 2045 and762. 9 Cohen1956; Conant 1956 . Ber. Wissenschaftsgesch. 42 (2019 Harvardpresident (aswellasS artons tudent)madehistory of sciencethe core of thegeneral scienceeducation programme. 10 All students,especiallythose not majoringi nt he naturals ciences, must acquirea nu nderstanding of what sciencei s andw hati t" can andcannota ccomplish." 11 Andtheys houldl earn this via" case histories,"h istoricalv ignettes showinga spectso ft he scientific method.I nC onant'sh ands,t he fields uddenlya cquired ac entral position on thep ost-war campus,a nd this wasp ossibleb ecause it cateredt oh is widely shared conviction that sciencewas what definedthe modern world, andthatinorder to understand that world, andtakealeadingpositioninit, onehad to grasphow sciencefunctioned.History of sciencecould providethatgrasp.
Elsewhere, leadingh istorianso fs cience also managedt oi nstitutionalize their fieldbut usually throughadifferentapproach. Alexandre KoyrØ in Parisand Her-bertButterfield in Cambridge, UK, sought to understand modernitynot through (essentially timeless)c asestudies butbylocatingitinasingle historical moment, as hift in mentality, an "intellectual' mutation'o fw hich modern physical science is at once theexpressionand thefruit." 12 This BigBang, of course, wasthe Scien-tificRevolution, aconcept that they launched andmadethe focusoftheir newly professionalized field. Butwhatsustained that fieldand itsprofessionalizationwas thes amec onvictiont hatC onant hadc atered to:t hatt he modern worldw as made by science, andthathistory of sciencewas thekey to grasping this.
What made thel attera pproachp revail,h owever,w as anothera sset:i ts stress on thei ntellectualc haracter of theh istory of science. This stood in contrast to ac onceptiono fs cience as ap roblem-solver, an instrument servingt he practical needso fs ociety.S uchaview hadb eenp romotedb yMarxists cience historians like BorisH essena nd J. D. Bernal whou sedh istorical argumentst oa dvocate Soviet-style scientific planning.Thishad hadappealduringthe GreatDepression andt he wary ears,b ut itsc ommunist connotations quicklym adei ts uspect during theColdW ar.AsAnnaMayer hasshown,the appointmentofthe firsthistory of scienceprofessor at Cambridgefollowedprecisely this path:promotedby Marxists cientistsi nt he 1930s,t he chairf inally fell to an intellectualh istorian afterthe war. Historyofscience nowservedanti-communist ends. 13 Forthe span of theirgeneration, then,the firstprofessionalhistoriansofscience taught that sciencew as ap articularw ay of thinking,b orno ut of theS cientific Revolution,layingthe foundationsofthe modern world. Butthismodernity was strictly of aW estern kind.C harles Gillispieo penlyw orried aboutw hatw ould happen if science's" instruments" (read:t he atomic bomb)w ould fall into the handso f" menn ot of theW est." 14 AndH enry Kissingerc oncluded that nations whohad missed the"impact of Newtonianthinking" were geopolitically secondrate. 15 Thef ield's master-narrativeh ence fitaCold Warp erspective with science as aunique mentality, markingthe difference betweenW esta nd East,developed andundeveloped. 10 Hamlin 2016. 11 Conant 1957,onvii ; Jewett2012, on 256ff. 12 KoyrØ 1989,on120. 13 Mayer2000. 14 Gillispie1960, on 9. 15 Kissinger1966, on 528.
This perspectivew as never without itsc ritics, buti nt he courseo ft he 1960s and7 0s doubts startedt od ominate. ThomasK uhn, teaching on Conant'sc asehistoryp rogramme,b egan to wonder whetherW estern sciencew as reallys odifferent from Sovieti ndoctrination. 16 Scholars around Joseph Needhamg ave aM arxist interpretation to theriseofW estern scienceitself. Andmoreand more studentsbecamecriticalofthe notion of scienceaspurethought,tending to what vaguelybecameknown as a"social historyofscience." Something like it wasinstitutionalized in theU niversityofP ennsylvania's History andS ociology of Science programme (startingin1970),inthe new Social StudiesofScience journal (1975), andfor instance in the maatschappelijkea specten movement in theN etherlands. 17 Thesenew sensibilitiesfound theirmostsystematicand critical elaborationinthe fieldofSociology of Scientific Knowledge(SSK)launchedinBritain.
What sustainedthisshift wasnot an anti-science sentimentbut agrowing aversion to viewings cience as singular, exalted, andr arefied. Much of thes tudent revolt of 1968 andafter was directed againstthe "ivorytower"(even though such academic isolation rarely existedi nr eality)a nd claimedt hats cientistsh ad a" social responsibility". 18 In history of sciencethe newbuzzwords were "practice" and"context,"shiftingfocus to what scientists did(oftenmanually)and howthey relatedtotheir world. 19 Such "loweringthe tone"had theeffectofrelativizingthe powerofexpertise,evenifnot denyingit-oneofSSK's founders, HarryCollins, wouldlater callfor more trustinexperts. 20 But, as hisfellow-founderDavid Bloor pointedo ut,t he newa pproachw as like biblical criticism: it didn ot necessarily underminebeliefinscience butits sacred aura. 21 Over thecourseofthe twentiethcentury,then, historyofscience evolved in response to changing circumstances: from belle Øpoque positivism viap ost-wars cientism to Cold Warm odernism and, finally,1 970s relativism. To day, we live in differenttimes again. Thereisnoneedtorejectour field'slastshift-the focuson practicea nd contexta nd subsequent developmentsh avem adei ta sr icha si ti s now. Butw eh avet oa cknowledge that thec ircumstances in whichw eo perate have markedly changed. Insteadofasacralizationofscience we find itsregular (if qualified) denouncement;i nstead of thev enerationo fe xpertise we find it being incessantlyquestioned. This does notmeanthatwewanttoreturn to theviews of ourfield of theC old Warp eriod. Nors houldi tb eo ur task to defend science. 22 Rather,w esuggest that thenew fluidity of cognitivea uthority raises questionsas to thehierarchy of knowledgeand itshistoricaldevelopment.How have different kindso fk nowledged efined each other, beenv alued, contrasted,a nd ranked? How hast he epistemological mapc hanged?W hata ccountsf or theses hiftsa nd their(temporary) stabilization? In otherwords:Whatdoesahistoryofknowledge look like? 16 Reisch 2012; Reisch2019. 17 Ripand Boeker 1975. 18 Shapin 2012. 19 Golinski 1990 . 20 Shapin 2010 Collins andEvans 2007. 21 Bloor1991, on 183-185. 22 Fordiscussions on thes ametopic within STS, seeaseries of articles in Social Studieso fScience 47 (2017),on3-6 and4(2017) on 580-586, 587-592, and593 -599.
Ber. Wissenschaftsgesch. 42 (2019):186 -199 In thef ollowing twos ections, respectively focusing on earlym oderna nd modern history, we show thepotential of such questions, tappingour ownexpertise andresearchaswellasemerginghistoriographiesinthe historyofscience and relatedf ields. We focuso ns uchc ategoriesa si gnorance,f ailure,p seudoscience, anddisciplinebecause they allowustoraise questions around theboundaries, hierarchies, andm utualc onstitutiono fd ifferent typeso fk nowledge which have pertinence in ourp resent-day societies, wheree xpertise anda uthority arer elentlessly questioned.
Failureand Ignorance
Giventhe currentfluidityofcognitiveauthority,one importantpointoffocus of attentionfor thehistory of knowledgeisthe role andassessmentoffailure andignorancei nt he production of knowledge. Failurea nd ignorancep oint to less highly valuedforms of knowledgeaswellasweaknessesinwaysofknowing.Y et, historians of knowledgewould arguetheyare inherent to processesofknowledgemaking,e veni fi tc oncernst ypes of knowledgew hich,h istoricallys peaking, at onepoint in time andinone place, were considered to be atthe topofthe evershifting hierarchy. Thehistory of knowledgehas emergent historiographies of precarity andi gnorance in thee arly modern period to buildu pon. Martin Mulsow hasa rguedf or thei mportanceo ft he category of precarious knowledge; he has shownh ow ther ecognition of thep recarity of knowledgel eads to questions aboutt he security andl osso fk nowledge as wella st or esearcho ns trategieso f preservation. 23 Likewise,hehas pointedtothe significance of strategies of howto deal with notk nowing,b ei td eveloped by ar uler at thee arly modern courti n Gothainrelationtoinvestments in alchemicaltransmutation,orduringimperialist andcolonialventuring into unknowndistant lands. 24 Ahistory of knowledge pays as much attentiont othe" dark sideo fk nowledge"; it explicitly deals with historical typologieso fi gnorance andh istoricals trategieso fd ealing with unknowns. 25 Here we will brieflydiscuss failure, whichhas recently received quiteabitofattention( andm edia coverage)a lthough, or perhapsj ustb ecause,c ontemporary scienceand societyare obsessed with success. Johannes Haushofer, Princetonprofessor of psychology,p ublished hisC Voff ailures, ando ther scholars have followedh im in this to show howi mportant failure hasb eent ot heir careersa nd processeso fl earning. Helsingborg, Sweden,i sh omet oaMuseum of Failure, whichh ousesacollectiono fmorethanahundredf ailedproductsf roms omeo f theworld'sbest-knowncompanies.Amuseum like this onewants to convey that failureisessential to innovation andbusinesssuccess,aconviction whichisshared by theM aastrichtU niversityInstitute of BrilliantF ailures. 26 In thehistory of science andtechnologyfailure plays aratherm inor role.G raemeGooday hasa ptly observedthatinthe historyoftechnology,failure hastypically been used to cate- 23 Mulsow 2012. 24 Mulsow andDaston2019, on 168-169. 25 Zwierlein2016. 26 Iske 2018 . Ber. Wissenschaftsgesch. 42 (2019 gorize "pathological"t echnologiest hatc learly demarcatet hemf roms uccesses. 27 Nevertheless,ahistoriography of failure, andr elated concepts andw ords such as "error"and "mistake", is emerging.The building of ahistoricaltypology of failure in theearly modern period is part of this ongoingendeavour.I tcould demarcate errors from mistakes,for example, alonglines of distinctionbetween thoughtand action,orbetween theabsence or presence of rulesornorms,while recognizingat thesametimethat, historically, thedistinctionbetween errorand mistakeisfluid andt hatd ifferent word categoriesw ereu sedi nv arious ways. 28 Ah istory of knowledgecan payattention to errorand failureifitiswritten from theperspective of epistemicv irtues.K lara Vanekh as shown, fore xample,how avoidanceo f errorwas tied to thedefinitionofthe bonus chirurgus in theearly modern period andh ow this wasl inkedt od ebates aboutt he valueo fa natomical, surgical,a nd medicalk nowledge as well as epistemichierarchies of hand andm ind. 29 Another approach,perhaps even more relevant in lightofcurrent debates,might be to historicize thee pistemic valueo ff ailure.O ne of us hast racede lsewhere ther iseo f a"poeticsoffailure"inthe earlymodernsciences. 30 Such an approach to theh istory of knowledgec an take recourse from much older historiographies in otherdisciplines,which regain currency,or, like some of MichaelP olanyi'snotions,havenever been absent from thehistory of scienceand technology sincet he 1970s.A nother historiography, that of craftt heory, treats failurea samundaneo ccurrencei nt echnologicald esign. In hist heoryo nt he nature of design andcraft, woodworker andprofessor at theRoyal College of Art, DavidPye argues that design cannot be failure-free. 31 Atechnologycannotm eet all requirements,and is alwaysbased upon acompromisebetweendesignrequirementst ob ef ulfilledi no rder to create an idealo bject. Accordingt oP ye,s uch acompromiseisalwaysasort of failure. Failureisthenunavoidably ubiquitous in all design andt echnology. Even if it werepossiblefor atechnologytosucceed at anym oment, lateru sers wouldc omew ithd ifferent requirements,a gain making failureinevitable. DifferentfromPye,Michael Polanyiseesfailure as an inevitable step towards success. In connection to "rules of skilla nd connoisseurshipw hich comprise importantt echnical processes,"P olanyis peakso f" theu sual processo f unconscioustrial anderror by whichwefeelour waytosuccess andmay continue to improveonour success withoutspecifiably knowinghow we do it." 32 Historicallys peaking,e arly modern artisans knew that onec ould only learnb yd oing, andthatthismeant making mistakes.Itisthisepistemicvalue of errorand failure whichthe French potter BernardP alissy andsomanyothersvoicedwhenexpressings cepticisma boutt he didactic value of theiro wn writings.F amously, Palissy made an allegoric figure called "Practice"r eluctant to tell "Theory"t he secret of whiteenamel. Palissyhad "Practice" sayt hatt hisw as notarefusalf or economic 27 Gooday 1998. 28 As election whichd ealsw itht he issueo ft ypology: Rigolot2 004; Neumaier 2010;G adebusch Bondio andParaviciniBagliani2012. 29 Vanek2014. 30 Thenextparagraphssummarize an argument more fullydeveloped in Epple, Müller,and Warner, forthcoming. 31 Pye1978, on 70. 32 Polanyi 2005, on 65.
Ber. Wissenschaftsgesch. 42 (2019):186 -199 reasons, butsimplybecause wordswerea nineffective waytolearn acraft."Even if Iusedathousand reamsofpaper to writedownall theaccidents that have happenedtomeinlearningthisart," Practicesays, "you must be assured that,however good ab rain you mayh ave, you wills till make at housandm istakes, which cannot be learnedf romw ritings, ande veni fy ou hadt hemi nw riting you wouldn't believethemuntil practice hasgiven youathousand afflictions." 33 Only longa nd sustainedexperience, includingt he making of mistakes inherent to the apprenticeship,leads to theacquisition of knowledge.
However,w hile artisans recognized thee pistemic value of failure, this didn ot necessarilyt ranslate to allg enreso fa rtisanal writings.I nf act, ap oeticso ff ailure characterizesthose artisanalwritingsw hich we mightcall "manuals", in thesense that they claimtoserve learning acraft,whether it be surgeryorgoldsmithing, in opposition to (mostf amously) the EncyclopØdie,i nw hich Diderotf ollowed alogicofrepresentationinhis descriptionofthe arts,and whichwas notintended to be used in thec ontext of instruction. Onee xample of such am anuali st he eighteenth-century Guidebook forU pcomingG old-and Silversmiths (1721) by the Dutchs ilversmithW illemv an Laer.V an Laer'sg uide presents itself as as orto f structured curriculum forthe apprentice,althoughitisinnoway intended to replace, butr athert oc omplement, hands-on educationo nt he workshop floor. 34 VanLaerwrote down hisinstructionsand descriptionsoftechniquesinways suggesting alternativeh istories of hiso wn failures.Atypicalp attern is that vanLaer suggests that acertain way of proceeding wouldfailand theresultcould be potentially disastrous.O ne examplei sh is suggestion that,w ithout thep reparation of theB russelssand to make themould,the cast will be undesirably" rough".I nhis book, failures areubiquitous, andheregularly includes extensivetrouble-shooting sections,f or example in hisd iscussiono fs oldering.A samaster silversmith, van Laer describesfailuresonlytosuggest howtocorrect them,but it is clearthatthe failures he describes arebased upon hisown workshop experience.
At theb eginning of thes eventeenth century, thee pistemicv alue of failure becamerecognizedinthe worldofscholarship, from themathematicalsciencesto naturalh istory.T he dissatisfactionw itht he wayso fw riting down knowledge hiding thei mperfectiono ft he processo fk nowledgep roduction, in conjunction with ab eliefi nt he open-endedness of processeso fk nowledge-making, became widely shared.JohannesKepler'spoetics of science, 35 forinstance, is in fact apoeticso ff ailure.I ns everal of hisb ooksinthe broaderf ield of mathematics, Kepler presentedh is knowledgea sanarrativeo ft he historical developmento fh is own pathsofinquiry.One exampleishis presentationinthe "Paralipomena" of hisinvestigationofthe measureofrefraction(or what came to be knownasSnell's law) takenfromhis Optics. Kepler's narrativeofhis research into refraction consists of threeapproacheswhich he triedout and, in theend,all failed to differentdegrees. Kepler startedwiththe data whichhehad received from themeasurementsofat-mosphericrefractionbyT ycho Braheand ChristophRothmannand thetablesof refractionw hich he gathered from medieval optics.Thisa pproachfailed, he tells 33 Palissy, 1957. 34 Hagendijk2018. 35 Hallyn 1990 . Ber. Wissenschaftsgesch. 42 (2019 hisr eader, andc haracterizingh is firsts trategyo fd iscoveryo ft he measure of refractiona s" an almostblind plan of enquiry,"heswitched gear andmoved on to as econdm ethod.H is second path of investigationw as fuelledb ya nalogies betweenrefractiona nd reflection,which howeverproductive, also failed in deliveringt he measureo fr efractiont hatK eplerh ad hopedf or.H em oved on to his thirdpathofinvestigation in whichhethought throughhis considerations of the causes of refraction. This thirdway allowedKeplertodiscover aconstantrelation between angles of incidencea nd angles of refraction,w hich only held fora ngles smallerthanthirtydegrees,and thus also fell shortofhis objectiveofthe discovery of themeasure of refraction.
In sum, Kepler's historical accountofhis pathsofinvestigation,characterizing them as failures,w as as trategyt oc opew itht he imperfectionso fk nowledgemaking,o pening it up forc orrectiona nd improvement. Keplerr ecognizedt he significance of learning from failure. Onecould arguethatitwas thevalue of failurewhich thelikes of Kepler,developingnew ways of knowinginthe sciences at thebeginning of theseventeenth century, adoptedfromthe worldofartisans.Itis telling that recentworkonmedical ethics-on howtodealwitherrorsinmedical practice-explicitly harksbacktothe work of Albrecht Dürerasasource of inspiration andamodelofthe recognitionofthe imperfectionsofknowledgeand the idealo fo penness. 36 It thus seemst hata rtisanalk nowledge remains as ourcef or therecognition of theepistemic value of failuretothisday,inthe same waythat it wasa roundt he year 1600. As such,ahistoryo fk nowledge, eveni nt he early modern period,gives significancetocurrent concerns in scienceand societyabout thevalue of variouswaysofknowing.
Late-ModernCartographies of Knowledge
Whilehistory of knowledgesheds newlight on early-modernknowledge-making, andits pertinence forcurrent practices,its approach is no less fruitful forlater periods. Some recent historiography (advertently or not) sustains that view.W hat sets theperiodfromthe nineteenth centuryonward apartfromearlier eras is that thecartography of knowledgewas more firmly institutionalizedinsystems of disciplines andp rofessions.B ut this does notm eant hats ucha rrangementsw ere fixed-inf actt heyk eptc hanging, andw eren ever all-inclusive, uncontested, or withouttension.Epistemichierarchies became more entrenched yetcontinued to shift.
Perhapst hisi sm oste asilyv isible in theo uter boundaries of science, which were once seen as setortaken forgranted. 37 Butclaimsofwhat is andwhatisnot scienceh avea lwaysb eens ubject to debate.T homasG ieryn hasc alledt hisc ontestation"boundary work"and hisown case studiesare vintagehistory of knowledge. 38 Onething they show is how ambiguousscientificbordercontrol couldbe. 36 GadebuschBondio2012, on 295-296. 37 Forexample,universalizinghistories of science, such as Sarton's or Needham's, hadtofix what was andwhatwas notscience. Their" many rivers,one sea" pictureofcontributionstothe global stock of knowledge hinged on sharpdelineationsofwhatcould countassuchacontribution. 38 Gieryn1999. Ber. Wissenschaftsgesch. 42 (2019):186 -199 In hisd efence of professional science, fore xample,J ohnT yndall stressed itse mpirical charactera gainst theologyand itstheoretical nature versus themechanical arts. 39 Ty ndall'sf lip-floppings uggestst hatd emarcatingw as less aboutd efining sciencethanabout identifyingits 'Others'.Other work reveals howpermeable the outerboundarycould be (see forexample arecentset of studiesonthe surprisingly manifold relationso ft he sciences to theh umanities). 40 Nord id only binary juxtapositions exist. Mid-twentiethc entury philosophers of science, fori nstance, claimeditwas their task to distinguishscience from non-science, creating atriangle of disciplinaryrelations.History of knowledgeinvites us to askwhatwas at stake in such rearrangements,and whytheyhappenedwhentheydid.
Recently, MichaelG ordinhas enriched thes tudy of boundaryw orkbya nalysing andh istoricizing thep henomenono f" pseudoscience". 41 Always ac ontested category (nopseudoscientist everidentifiedassuch),its meaninghas oftenclosely followeds cience's self-understanding.A sG ordin'sc aseo fI mmanuelV elikovsky's controversialc osmographys hows,i ni ts attempts at recognitions uchw ould-be sciencetends to take on thetrappings of ther ealthing:falsifiability, peer review, naturalistic explanations, whatever counts at them oment. Butp recisely because of this imitation, pseudosciencec an never be presumed identifiable on theb asis of itso wn distinguishing characteristics. 42 Pseudosciencei sn ot an alternativet o regulars cience,i ti si ts shadow,f ollowing it,r esemblingi t, andn ever disappearing.
Boundary-drawingo fs cience versuso ther categories of knowledgei sn ot only aboutp rofessionalr elationships,i tc an also have geopolitical implications.I na n eye-openings tudy,M arwa Elshakry investigated wheret he notion of sciencea s Westernh as come from. 43 Notm erelyf romC old WarA nglo-Saxonh istorians, shea rgues, butt oalargee xtent also from scholars "not of theW est."I nn ineteenth-century Egypta nd China, shes hows,b itso fk nowledgea nd news of discovery from Europe werer eadily absorbed into local traditions of scholarship withoutm uchd istinction.T he Chineset erm gezhixue included both,a sd id the Arabic 'ilm. Only with rising reservations aboutthe blessingsofthe European imports, andS penglerian notionso fadeclineo ft he West,d id aj uxtaposition of "traditional"t o" modern," ando f" Arab"a nd "Chinese" to "Western," science emerge,this"Westernscience"b eing considered at thesamet imel ocal in origin anduniversal in aspiration. Elshakry adds to heranalysist hats he couldnot have made it within theconfinesofanunproblematized historyofscience preciselybecausethe definition of itsobjectitselfisatstake.But ahistory of knowledgeper-39 Gieryn1999, on 37 -64. 40 Krämer2018. 41 Gordin 2012. 42 Steven Shapin hass uggested onep otential identifier:t ryingt oo hard." Beware of hyperscience.I t canbeasign that somethingisn't kosher.Aruleofthumb forsound inferencehas always been that if it looksl ikeaduck,s wimsl ikeaduck andq uacksl ikeaduck,t heni tp robablyi saduck.B ut there'sacorollary:ifitstrutsaroundthe barnyard loudly protesting that it's aduck, that it possesses thev ery essenceofduckness,that it'sm orea uthentically aduckthan allthose otherorange-billed, web-footed,s wimming fowl,t henyou'veg ot ar ight to be suspicious:t hisduckmay be aq uack." SeeShapin2012, on 38. 43 Elshakry 2010 . Ber. Wissenschaftsgesch. 42 (2019 195 spective allows hertoask thekinds of questionswhere "science"isbut oneofseveral categoriesofvarying meaningand translatability.
Ahistory of knowledgedoesnot need to limititselftothe delineationo f" science," however. Maps of knowledge have many borders, provinces, andr egions, in ando ut of science, andc hangingo vert ime. Specialization hasn aturally increasedt he number of fiefdoms,b ut mergersh avea lsoo ccurred, such as solidstatephysics (combiningexistingbranchesinaninterdisciplinaryway)and evolutionaryb iology( addinga nu mbrella).M oreover, some fields of knowledgeh ave dwindled or disappeareda ltogether( thinko fp hrenologyo rc olloid chemistry), some have become"servicedisciplines"(statistics,nursing), andstill otherbranches areofanotfully scientific status (physiotherapy,car mechanics).There is nothingfixed aboutthese cartographical hierarchies(nurses used to aspire to thestatus of doctores medicinae,but simply lostthisbattle),atleast forthe time being. Historicizing thedynamicsofsuchinterdisciplinaryrelations is preciselywhatahistory of knowledgecan do.
Such aproject canveryfruitfully borrowfromthe sociologyofprofessions,particularlyapproachesdeveloped sincethe 1980s by AndrewAbbottand subsequent scholars. 44 Abbott sees professionsi np ermanent competitionf or what he calls "jurisdiction"overcertain tasks, that is,the righttoperform them.Onlysurgeons canl egally performo perations, fori nstance, yeto phthalmologists have come to sharetheir monopoly on eyemeasurement with opticians. In Abbott's frame, battles over jurisdiction aref oughto ut in differenta renas( public media, thec ourtroom,the work floor), they employ differentstrategies(such as reducing weather forecasting to physics),a nd they lead to variouss ettlementoptions.A bbott'sturf wars arenot all-or-nothing.Theycan alsoleadtocooperation,divisionofterritory,subordination,ordiarchy.Thisrichnessmakes hisapproachextremely fruitful forh istorianso fk nowledge,p articularlyt hose workingo nt he system of disciplines that governsmodernmapsofknowledge.
Anothera ngle on epistemich ierarchies andtheir changingi nstitutionalization involves looking at bricks andmortar. Alreadyinthe 1980s Sophie Forgan pointed outwhatthe architecture of learnedsocieties canrevealabout theirexternalrelations. In Victorian Britain, aneoclassicaldesignw as oftenc hosent oc onferauthoritya nd permanence,w hile aT udor style invokedo pennesst ow orking class participation. 45 In contemporaneousD utch contexts, neo-Renaissancew as the style of thel earned liberale lites, whereasn eogothic signalleda ttemptst or econnect sciencew itht he (newly emancipated)C atholict raditionso fk nowledge. 46 Butthe system of disciplinesperhaps findsits most direct mappinginthe lay-out of university campuses. Lorraine Daston hasr ecentlys uggestedt ot aket he centralityo f, say, theI nstitute of Philologys eriously,o rt oc onsidert he relative distancebetweenbuildings forhistory andnatural history. 47 Severalscholars in Germany andthe Netherlandsare nowlooking into campusesasmapsofknowledge setinstone creating atopographical historyofknowledge. 48 44 Abbott 1988. 45 Sophie Forgan hasw ritten an entire oeuvre on thes ubject.T he piecec ited here is Forgan 1986. 46 Weerdenburg1994. 47 Daston 2017,on146 -147. 48 ForthcomingworkbyFabian Krämer, Ab Flipse andAbelStreefland.
Finally,history of knowledgedoesnot need to be confined to epistemiccartography. It can equally fruitfully askw hatc onstitutes knowledgei nt he firstp lace andhistoricize that question.Inarecent book Alex Csiszardoesexactly that,seekinganswers,fascinatingly,inthe historyofscientificpublishing. 49 To daythe standard form of alegitimateclaim to knowledgeisthe scientific research article. Discoveries mayalsobecommunicatedbyemail, pressrelease,orPowerPointpresentation,but none of thesesettles both claimand author as firmly as ajournal publication.Y et this wasn't always so.B eforet he 1830s,itw as academy proceedings andbook-length treatisesthatc arried this weight,while journalswerepartofthe louda nd unruly worldo ft he popularp ress.W hent hisf ormatp reference changed, so didthe locationo fe pistemic authority, as well as conceptionsofa uthorship andscientificproductivity. Allcametogetherinthe changing definitions of thebasic building blocks of knowledge. Hence, Csiszar'sworkcan very wellbe read as ah istory of knowledge, andatimely onea tt hat. As thea uthori sw ell aware, questionso ff ormat, control, anda uthority areh ighlyt opical againn ow that subscription journalsa re losingc ontrol ands cientificn ewsa nd data arei ncreasingly shared acrossnew platforms. Such fluidity of epistemicc ategoriescalls forahistory of knowledge.
Conclusion
Historyofknowledge does notjustexpandthe boundariesofhistory of science, it investigatest hose very boundaries, between sciencea nd otherf orms of knowledge,and between differentforms of scienceand differentforms of otherknowledge,inall possible combinations.M oreover,itasksquestions about basic epistemicc ategories, theiri nterrelationsa nd mutual constitution,a gain both within andoutside of science. What is acontributiontoknowledge? What is afailedattemptatsuch? How is such failureevaluated?H ow does knowledgerelatet oignorance? Historyo fk nowledge historicizes such questionsand asks whyparticularanswersweregiven at particular times. At thesametime, historyofknowledge responds to currentc oncerns, just as historyo fs cience hasd onet hroughoutt he twentiethcentury.Intoday'sclimate of fluidcognitiveauthority,contestedexpertise,a nd changingf orms of knowledgep roductiona nd communication, history of knowledgec an provideadeeper understanding. It is thef ield fort he twentyfirstcentury.Itishistory that matterstothe future of knowledgesocieties.
